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JUDICIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO LEGISLATING
EQUALITY FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Bruce Carolan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Superficially, Europe appears far more advanced than the United States in
legislating for equality for sexual minorities, i.e., lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
transgendered individuals.1  For example, the European Union ("EU")2 has
adopted a directive compelling its member states to adopt national legislation
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.3 The
deadline for implementing this legislation was December 2, 2003.4
In fact, some of the member states, such as Ireland, already had in place
national legislation prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation even prior to Council Directive 2000/78 mandating the adoption of
* Head of School of Social Sciences and Legal Studies, Dublin Institute of Technology, Dublin,
Ireland. Bruce.carolan@dit.ie. This article developed from the inaugural lecture of the Darden
Diversity Lecture Series hosted by the Department of Management and Legal Studies of the
University of Florida Warrington College of Business. My thanks to Professors Virginia Maurer and
Larry DiMatteo of the University of Florida. The article benefited from my participation in the
Hubert Hurst Research Seminar at the University of Florida on February 10-12, 2005. My thanks to
Professors Robert Thomas, Terry Dworkin, and the other participants of the Hurst Research Seminar
for helpful comments. Any errors are my own.
1. The term "sexual minorities" typically includes individuals who self-identify as lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and/or transgendered. For purposes of examining EU law, it is important to distinguish
between individuals with a homosexual or bisexual orientation, and those who are transgendered. This
distinction is necessary because, as will become apparent, the category "sexual minority" is not
homogenous under EU law. EU law distinguishes between lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals on
the one hand, and transgendered individuals on the other. Compare Case C-249/96, Grant v. South-
West Trains Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 (holding that EU law does not prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation), with Case C-13/94, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143
(holding that EU law prohibits discrimination based on transsexuality).
2. The EU has undergone a number of name changes since the 1957 EEC Treaty created the
European Economic Committee. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The Maastricht Treaty dropped the word
"Economic" to form the European Community, and introduced the phrase "European Union." See
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 325) 5, 9 (2002)
[hereinafter EU Treaty]. The abbreviation EU will be employed in most instances for ease of
reference, even when referring to the earlier European (Economic) Community.
3. Council Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000 Establishing a General Framework for Equal
Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 [hereinafter Council Directive
2000/78].
4. Id. at art. 18.
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such national laws.5 Ireland, and other member states with such pre-existing
national legislation, will be able to rely on these laws as satisfying the obligation
under EU law to adopt laws implementing the Council Directive. It is difficult to
imagine similar developments in the United States at this time.
6
However, European legislative developments obscure a deeper,
philosophical query that remains unresolved at a pan-European national and
supranational level. That query is: what constitutes "discrimination based on
sexual orientation"? For example, if an employer refuses to extend "spousal"
benefits to the same-sex partner of an employee, does that constitute
discrimination based on sexual orientation? What if these employment benefits
(such as free travel passes) are made available to opposite-sex unmarried couples,
but not to same-sex couples in a similarly long-term, stable relationship? Would
this constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation? Does it make any
difference if the same-sex partnership is registered in a member state of the EU,
where such registration provides many (if not most) of the benefits associated with
opposite-sex civil marriage?
The answer to these questions may depend upon judicial interpretation of
the relevant European and national laws, by such bodies as the European Court of
Justice ("ECJ"). An early test of the meaning of the concept of discrimination
based on sexual orientation may arise when member state laws purporting to
5. See Employment Equality Act (1998) (Ir.) [hereinafter EEA]. A comprehensive survey of the
EU member states which have implemented Council Directive 2000/78 in a timely fashion has not yet
been undertaken. It is not unusual for member states to be tardy in implementing directives. See e.g.
Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357 (referring to the fact
that Italy had been subject of prior enforcement action by the European Commission for failing to
implement directive at issue in case).
6. In fact, the legislative trend in the United States has been the reverse of that in Europe. For
example, at least seventeen states have amended their state constitutions to define marriage as
exclusively between a man and a woman. A complete listing of state laws on marriage is available at
the web page for the Human Rights Campaign, Equality in the States: Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and
Transgender Americans and State Laws and Legislation, http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=
YourCommunity&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8471 (accessed
Apr. 9, 2005). In the U.S. House of Representatives, a proposed constitutional amendment has been
introduced that would define marriage as being exclusively between a man and a woman. H.R. Jt. Res.
56, 108th Cong. (May 21, 2003). A companion bill has been introduced in the Senate. Sen. Jt. Res. 26,
108th Cong. (Nov. 25, 2003).
7. The ECJ was established by articles 220-245 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002,
O.J. (C 325) 33 (2002) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Among other things, the Court has jurisdiction to give
"preliminary rulings" concerning "the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community." Id. at art. 234. This means that, if an individual believes that a member state has failed
to properly or adequately implement a directive, such as Council Directive 2000/78, into its laws, it may
ultimately be up to the Court to interpret the directive and assess whether the measures taken to
implement the directive into the national law were adequate.
The European Commission ("the Commission") also plays a role in interpreting the acts of the
institution. Among other things, the Commission has a responsibility to "ensure that the provisions of
this Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied." Id. at art. 211.
Article 18 of Council Directive 2000/78 requires that member states report to the Commission what
steps they have taken to implement the Directive into their national law. The Commission has the
power to bring an enforcement action against a member state if it feels the measures taken by the
member state to implement a directive are not adequate. Id. at art. 226. However, as explained above,
it is the ECJ that has the ultimate power to give an "interpretation of acts of the institutions." Id. at
art. 234.
2
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implement the council directive prohibiting such discrimination are challenged by
individuals who claim that they fail to adequately do so.8
In the United States, sexual minorities have turned to state and federal
courts to protect themselves from discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Lesbians and gays have achieved some success in these actions, resulting in United
States Supreme Court decisions striking down legislation that precluded
enactment of future civil rights protections for homosexuals9 and prohibited same-
sex sodomy.10 At the state level, there have been favorable rulings on the issue of
same-sex marriage, resulting in civil union legislation being adopted in Vermont"
and same-sex marriage being made available in Massachusetts.12 These judicial
gains have in some instances resulted in a legislative backlash, with at least
seventeen states adopting state constitutional amendments defining marriage as
being exclusively between a man and a woman. 3 Thus, a somewhat progressive
judiciary has been thwarted, in some instances, by a conservative legislative
backlash.
The reverse situation holds true in Europe. There, it is the ECJ that has
acted as a conservative force, with decisions that may weaken progressive
legislation at the national and supranational level' 4 These decisions may result in
a very narrow construction of the concept of discrimination based on sexual
orientation in national and EU legislation, and drain such antidiscrimination
legislation of any substantial impact. Ironically, the conservative decisions of the
ECJ concerning discrimination based on sexual orientation stand side by side with
its more progressive judgments that have prohibited discrimination based on
transgendered status, even in the absence of express EU legislation prohibiting
such discrimination. 5 In cases brought by transsexual individuals or their
partners, the ECJ has given an expansive interpretation of the demands of
unwritten, general principles of EU law regarding fundamental principles of
equality and nondiscrimination. 6 Simultaneously, the Court has refused to grant
8. There are at least four types of legislation that can be adopted under EU law: regulations,
directives, decisions, and recommendations/opinions. A regulation is binding in its entirety and
becomes part of member state national law without the need for transposing national legislation. In
fact, a member state is prohibited from purporting to adopt national legislation that transposes a
regulation into national law. A directive specifies a particular outcome, but leaves the choice of form
and methods for achieving that outcome to the member state to which it is addressed. A directive
represents a means by which the national law of the member states can be harmonized while respecting
the unique legal features of each member state. A directive always provides a deadline by which it
must be implemented. A decision binds only the party to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations/opinions are nonbinding, and are sometimes referred to as "soft law." EC Treaty,
supra n. 7, at art. 249.
9. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
10. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
12. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
13. Supra n. 6.
14. See e.g. Joined Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99, D & Sweden v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319 and
Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 (rejecting claims of entitlements to marital benefits for same-sex couples).
15. See e.g. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143.
16. There are several sources of EU law in addition to legislation adopted by the political
institutions pursuant to article 249 of the EC Treaty. These sources include the Treaty itself and
3
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similar protection to lesbians and gay men, even in the face of express legislation
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, by giving a restrictive
interpretation of the concept of discrimination.17
This article contends that, notwithstanding the superficial appearance of
progress in achieving equality for lesbians and gays, decisions of the ECJ that pre-
date recent legislative enactments threaten to undermine legislative efforts to
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. This observation is true
particularly with respect to claims by same-sex couples. I will explore this premise
in the context of a possible judicial challenge to the express terms of the Irish
legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. Irish legislation
takes a very narrow view of what constitutes such discrimination. The issue likely
to face the ECJ is whether this very conservative view satisfies the requirement
under EU law to adequately implement Council Directive 2000/78.8 My
conclusion is that the Court, applying its prior decisions, is likely to reject a
challenge to the Irish legislation, and thus set a very low benchmark for
implementing the principle of equality for sexual minorities into the national law
of EU member states. The Court has changed its analysis to allow itself to reach
contradictory conclusions, without expressly acknowledging the change in its
approach.
This article further contends that the ECJ decisions are irreconcilable and
incoherent. They represent a judicial impediment to efforts to legislate equality
for sexual minorities in Europe, particularly sexual minorities in same-sex
partnerships. Further legislation, particularly in the area of employment benefits
for same-sex partners, may be required to redress the regressive effect of these
judgments. Part III of this article provides the background of EU equality
international agreements. Another important source of law has been termed "General Principles of
European Union Law," which have been announced by the ECJ. The most important of these general
principles are the judicially-created "Fundamental Principles of Human Rights," which include the
principles of nondiscrimination and equality. See generally Paul Craig & Grdinne de Btirca, EU Law:
Texts, Cases, and Materials ch. 9 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 2003).
17. See e.g. D & Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319; Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621.
18. After a member state has adopted national legislation that implements the objective specified in
the directive, an individual relies upon the law that has implemented the directive. See e.g. Case
152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), 1986
E.C.R. 723 (noting that plaintiff initially sought to rely upon national law in support of her claim). In
the event that the national court rules that the national law does not provide the remedy sought, the
individual could seek to rely upon the terms of the directive itself. See id. (noting that plaintiff was
unsuccessful on her national law claim but ultimately prevailed on her claim based on EU directive).
In that case, the individual would seek to invoke a principle known as "direct effect": this principle
allows an individual, in proper circumstances, to rely upon the terms of the directive in the national
court. See Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. Supremacy and direct effect of EU law are
the twin, judicially created pillars that uphold the successful operation of the European integration
project. Direct effect, established by the ECJ in the landmark case of van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R.
1, means that, in the proper circumstances, an individual who believes that his or her rights under EU
law have been violated can bring an action in the national court, and that court is obliged to enforce
EU law. In essence, this transforms every EU citizen into a private attorney general, and greatly
enhances the effectiveness (effet utile) of EU law. Of course, directly effective EU law would be
ineffective if it were not superior to conflicting national law. Hence, shortly after announcing the
direct effect of EU law, the ECJ expressly decided that EU law was supreme to national law. See
Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 585.
[Vol. 40:527
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legislation. Part IV focuses on the development of human rights jurisprudence by
the ECJ. Part V reviews the adoption of EU and Irish legislation prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Part VI sets forth an analysis of ECJ
decisions concerning claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation. Part
VII analyzes a possible challenge to Irish equality legislation under EU law. Part
VIII presents a brief conclusion.
II. LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION-BRIEF OVERVIEW
An understanding of the premise that the decisions of the ECJ are a
potential impediment to EU legislation designed to promote equality for sexual
minorities (and, particularly, same-sex couples) requires a brief overview of the
institutions of the EU, the law-making procedures of these institutions, and the
relationship between the law of the EU and the national law of the individual
member states.
A. Institutions of the European Union
The principal legislative institutions of the EU are the Council of Ministers,
the European Commission ("the Commission"), and the European Parliament.
The principal judicial institution is the ECJ and its associated court, the Court of
First Instance. In many respects, the institutional structure of the EU is unique,
without easy parallel to the tripartite form of government in the United States, or
the parliamentary form of government in the United Kingdom.
The Council of Ministers consists of "a representative of each Member State
at ministerial level, authorised to commit the government of that Member State."' 9
Although the European Community Treaty ("EC Treaty") requires that members
of the Commission be chosen on the grounds of their "general competence," ' it is
silent concerning the qualifications required of members of the Council of
Ministers. This reflects the fact that the Council is the voice of the member states
21
and that its members represent national, and not EU, interests. The
representative to the Council of Ministers must also have the power to bind the
member state that he represents.
The membership of the Council of Ministers is not static. Its makeup
changes according to the issues that are being considered. For example, if an
agricultural issue is under discussion, the membership of the Council of Ministers
typically will consist of the Ministers of Agriculture from the member states (or, at
least, representatives who have the power to bind their member states).
22
The Commission consists of a President and 25 members, chosen by common
accord among the member states, whose independence "is beyond doubt." 23 The
19. EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 203. See Bruce Carolan, EU Law for Irish Students 21 (Gill &
Macmillan 2004); Craig & de Btirca, supra n. 16, at 65.
20. EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 213.
21. Carolan, supra n. 19, at 21; see also Craig & de Btrca, supra n. 16, at 54-65.
22. Carolan, supra n. 19, at 21; see also Craig & de Btrca, supra n. 16, at 65-71.
23. EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 213.
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EC Treaty provides that: "In the performance of [their] duties, they shall neither
seek nor take instructions from any government.",24  The members of the
Commission are appointed for a term of five years.25 Among other things, the
Commission must "ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures
,26taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied." The Commission is
27
assisted by a permanent bureaucracy that is divided into Directorates General.
These Directorates General are divided by substantive policy areas, such as
Agriculture, Competition, the Internal Market, and External Relations.28
The European Parliament, which consists of "representatives of the peoples
. ,,29
of the States brought together in the Community," is elected by direct universal
suffrage. 30 Representatives are elected for a term of five years." Parliament must
approve the aPEointment of the President of the Commission and the other
commissioners.
B. Lawmaking Procedures of the European Union
For many years, the catchphrase that summarized the lawmaking procedure
of the EU was, "The Commission proposes, and the Council disposes. 3 3 In other
words, the Commission drafted proposed legislation and submitted it to the
Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers then voted whether to accept or
reject the proposed legislation. The voting procedures in the Council of Ministers
were quite complex. Many votes were taken pursuant to a weighted voting
procedure known as "Qualified Majority Voting," in which the weight assigned to
the vote of each member of the Council varied according to the size of the
member's home state. 34 The voting formula also addressed other concerns,
however, such as avoiding dominance over the smaller member states by the
larger states, and vice versa. The EC Treaty (on which all legislation had to be
based) specified when the qualified majority voting procedure had to be used (as
opposed to a simple majority vote).
The European Parliament once played little or no role in the adoption of EU
legislation. When the EC Treaty required the participation of Parliament, the
Council and the Commission were free to ignore any opinion that Parliament
24. Id.
25. Id. at art. 214.
26. Id. at art. 211.
27. See Craig & de Bdrca, supra n. 16, at 66.
28. See id.
29. EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 189.
30. Id. at art. 190(1).
31. Id. at art. 190(3).
32. Id. at art. 214(2).
33. See Carolan, supra n. 19, at ch. 4. This catchphrase arose from the original wording of article
189 of the EC Treaty (since re-numbered as article 249), which provided that "the Council and the
Commission shall" make laws for the EU. Article 249 now provides that "the European Parliament
acting jointly with the Council, the Council and the Commission shall" make laws for the EU.
Parliament's role in the adoption of legislation thereby has been increased.
34. Carolan, supra n. 19, at 23-40; see also Craig & de Bdrca, supra n. 16, at ch. 4.
[Vol. 40:527
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might provide. This lack of participation by Parliament led to criticisms of the EU
as suffering from a democratic deficit. Over the years since the first direct
elections of the members of Parliament, the role of Parliament in the adoption of
EU legislation has gradually increased. At present Parliament is approximately an
equal partner with the Council of Ministers in the adoption of EU legislation,
insofar as Parliament now has the power to "kill off" most legislation with which it
disagrees. 35 There is a procedure whereby differences between the Council and
Parliament can be reconciled, much in the manner that the two houses of the U.S.
Congress seek to reconcile differences over bills before Congress. In some
instances Parliament still lacks the power to kill off EU legislation, but in the case
of most legislative proposals, Parliament enjoys full powers of co-decision. 6
C. Relationship between European Union and National Law
EU law is supreme to the law of the member states.37 It also possible for an
38individual to invoke EU law in his or her national courts. The national courts
are obliged to recognize EU law, even if it has not formally been transposed into
the national law. 39 The national courts must fashion appropriate remedies if they
determine that EU law has been violated." They must further ensure that the
remedy provided is at least as generous as the remedy provided by an analogous
national law.4' The remedy must be effective, irrespective of the remedy available
for violation of the analogous provision of national law.
42
Most of the legislation enacted in the EU takes the form of regulations or
directives.43  Regulations are binding in their entirety, and become part of the
domestic national legal order without the need for transposing legislation." A
directive, on the other hand, is directed to one or more member states, and
35. Supra n. 33 and accompanying text.
36. Article 251 of the EC Treaty sets forth the co-decision procedure, which now applies to most
legislation proposed by the EU. See Carolan, supra n. 19, at 72-73; Craig & de Bdrca, supra n. 16, at
144-47. Article 251 provides that, after the Council of Ministers has adopted a common position on a
proposed piece of legislation, it must send it to the European Parliament. If Parliament, acting by an
absolute majority of its members, rejects the common position, "the proposed act shall be deemed not
to have been adopted." EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 251(2)(b). This article thus affords Parliament
the power to terminate a piece of legislation in many circumstances. However, not all legislative
proposals are subject to this co-decision procedure. See Carolan, supra n. 19, at 72.
37. See Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585.
38. See van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
39. See e.g. Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357 (discussing the existence and scope of a member state's
liability for breaches of community law).
40. See e.g. Case 14/83, von Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984 E.C.R. 1891; see also Bruce
Carolan, Winning Isn't Everything: National Judicial Protection of Rights under European Community
Law, 5 Tulsa J. Comp. & Intl. L. 89 (1997).
41. See Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer far das Saarland, 1976 E.C.R.
1989.
42. See von Colson, 1984 E.C.R. 1891.
43. Article 249 of the EC Treaty provides: "In order to carry out their task and in accordance with
the provisions of this Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and
the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make recommendations or
deliver opinions."
44. Article 249 provides: "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States."
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specifies an outcome, but leaves the choice of form and method for achieving this
outcome to the member state.45 The directive sets, a deadline by which the
member state is meant to achieve the specified outcome-typically by adopting
national legislation or regulations that achieve the goals specified.
A member state may sometimes fail to adequately implement a directive
into the national law. Individuals who seek to rely upon the national law may find
that it does not provide the remedy to which they believe they are entitled under
the EU directive.46 In the proper circumstances, an individual may essentially
"leapfrog" over national legislation and seek to rely upon the terms of the
underlying directive. Ultimately the ECJ may be asked, pursuant to the
preliminary reference procedure specified in the EC Treaty, whether the member
state has adequately implemented the directive.4 ' That query is the likely method
by which the ECJ's interpretation of discrimination based on sexual orientation
will come to a head. That query, particularly in the context of same-sex couples, is
also the focus of the remainder of this article.
III. BACKGROUND OF EUROPEAN UNION "EQUALITY" LEGISLATION
The six founding members of the then European Economic Community
("EEC") were France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries: Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 48 The signing of the European Economic
Community Treaty ("EEC Treaty") 49 in 1957 represented a bold step in the
history of international relations between sovereign states. The EEC was later
described by the ECJ as a "new legal order" in international law, for the benefit of
which the member states had surrendered a measure of their sovereignty and
agreed to live under a set of rules that were supreme to their own national laws.5°
The original EEC Treaty contained a rule regarding the equal treatment of
men and women in the area of pay. Article 119 (now Article 141) of the Treaty
provided: "Each Member State shall ensure that the principle of equal pay for
male and female workers for equal work or work of equal value is applied." This
seems a very progressive sentiment for 1957. For one thing, the Article requires
that men and women receive equal pay for equal work, which was not always the
case at the time." Second, the Article requires equal pay for work of equal value.
45. Article 249 provides: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods."
46. See e.g. von Colson, 1984 E.C.R. 1891 (allowing claimants who were dissatisfied with remedy
provided under German law for sex discrimination to invoke underlying directive, which German law
purported to implement); see also Carolan, supra n. 40.
47. EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 234 (providing that a member state court may refer a matter to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling concerning treaty or statutory interpretation).
48. Craig & de Btrca, supra n. 16, at 10-12.
49. Supra n. 2.
50. van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1 at Grounds (II)(B).
51. See e.g. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976
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This exceeds the requirement of equal pay for equal work. Under this principle, it
would be theoretically possible for a woman employed as a secretary, for instance,
to argue that she should be paid as much as someone employed in a
predominantly male field such as that of security guard, on the basis that these
represented employments of equal value. One might think the EEC was ahead of
its time in articulating fundamental human rights principles of equality and
nondiscrimination. However, this view would be incorrect.
The EEC was primarily about "economics," as its name implies. One of the
primary goals, if not the primary goal, of the EEC Treaty was the creation of a
52common market. A common market would guarantee, among other things, the
free movement of goods, workers, services, and capital. The rationale underlying
the goals of the EEC, including the creation of a common market, was that once
the factors of production were free to move to their highest and best use (through
the elimination of protectionist barriers represented by customs duties and
quantitative restrictions) the result would be the maximization of consumer
welfare.53 The removal of tariffs likely would cause some local economic
dislocation. Firms that had been protected by tariffs might go out of business
when faced with competition from more efficient companies from other countries.
However, the hope was that economic gains to consumer welfare would more than
offset these economic losses.
The creation of a common market was seen as a necessary, but not
necessarily sufficient, condition for this wealth maximization. It would also be
necessary to ensure that all the member states were operating on a level playing
field. Rules would be needed to ensure that neither private actors nor member
states attempted to obtain an unfair advantage in other ways, now that customs
duties, quantitative restrictions, and other restrictions on free trade had been
eliminated. European antitrust laws, known as competition laws, were enacted to
prevent private actors from colluding to divide markets, and thus thwart efforts to
create a single European market.54
The desire for a level playing field was also the motivation behind
demanding equal pay for men and women throughout the European Community.
If one member state allowed women to be paid less than men, that state would
enjoy an unfair advantage in trying to attract businesses to its territory. One of
52. The goal of creating a common market would be underpinned by a strong institutional
structure. The institutions of the EEC comprised the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the
Assembly (later re-named the European Parliament), and the ECJ, institutions that continue, in
slightly altered form, in the modern EU. See EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at arts. 189-245. For a general
discussion of the development of the modem structure of the EU, see Carolan, supra n. 19, at chs. 2-3;
Craig & de Btlrca, supra n. 16, at ch. 1.
53. Carolan, supra n. 19, at 7.
54. The competition laws are set forth primarily at what are now Articles 81 and 82 of the EC
Treaty. Article 81 roughly parallels section 1 of the U.S. Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)) and
prohibits collusive behavior such as price fixing and market division. Article 82 roughly parallels
section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2) and prohibits "abuse" of a "dominant position," the
European equivalent of monopolization. Although EU competition laws share many of the same goals
as U.S. antitrust laws, the continuing creation of a single European market has caused the EU
competition laws to develop certain unique traits not shared by U.S. antitrust laws.
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the factors of production-labor-would be less expensive in some member states
if the EEC did not require equality in pay between men and women.
Thus, human rights were not the primary motive behind the 1957 adoption
of what is now Treaty Article 141. According to the ECJ, the EEC enjoyed only
the limited competence specified in the treaties underpinning it55 --much like the
U.S. federal government enjoys only powers enumerated in the U.S.
Constitution-and that competence did not extend to human rights. The EEC
was concerned only with economic matters.
Ultimately, the EEC, using powers bestowed upon it under Treaty Article
141 (formerly Article 119), adopted secondary legislation in the form of directives
that imposed additional obligations on member states in the area of equal
treatment for men and women.5' The most prominent legislation was perhaps
Council Directive 76/207 ("Equal Treatment Directive"),57 adopted by the
European Council of Ministers in 1976, which commanded member states to
adopt national laws that would ensure equal treatment of men and women in all
aspects of employment, including hiring and firing and other working conditions.
In adopting this directive, the Council of Ministers did not invoke principles
of fundamental human rights to justify the equal treatment of men and women in
employment. Instead, the Council invoked economic considerations. It referred
to the "harmonization of living and working conditions"5 8 throughout the EEC. In
other words, the European Community was again not motivated by human rights
considerations; rather, it was concerned with making sure there was an
economically level playing field to advance the goal of creating a common market
in which the factors of production could move to their highest and best use, free
from artificial restraints that might be imposed by member states.
These were the foundations of the principles of equal treatment in the EU,
which differ radically from the explicitly justice-based considerations behind
similar U.S. legislation, such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act,5 9 which, among other
things, prohibits employment discrimination based on race or sex. However,
human rights considerations gradually worked their way into European
Community thinking. This opened up the possibility of expanding the protections
contained in the existing EEC Treaty and legislation to broader categories of
discrimination, such as discrimination based on sexual orientation and
transsexuality. How did this transformation occur? The next section of this article
traces the revolutionary discovery of human rights protections within Community
law.
55. See e.g. Case 1/58, Friedrich Stork & Cie v. High Authority, 1959 E.C.R. 17 at 4 (stating that
the Court was required to apply Community law, and not the national law of the member states).
56. See e.g. Council Directive 76/207 of 9 February 1976 on the Implementation of the Principle of
Equal Treatment for Men and Women as Regards Access to Employment, Vocational Training &
Promotion, & Working Conditions, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40 [hereinafter Council Directive 76/207].
57. Id.
58. Id. at preamble.
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2000).
[Vol. 40:527
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The EEC Treaty was not the first international agreement among the six
original member states, although many observers regard it as the starting point of
the modem EU. The decision to create a community expressly limited to
economic issues followed previous unsuccessful attempts by the six original
member states to cooperate in broader areas of concern, including common
defense and political matters.
In 1951, the six original member states agreed to form a European Coal and
Steel Community. These member states ratified the European Coal and Steel
Community Treaty ("ECSC Treaty"),6° pursuant to which the coal and steel
resources of the six member states were put under the control of a central
institution known as the High Authority. Essentially, the Treaty created a
common market in coal and steel: member states forfeited their sovereign right to
set tariffs or quotas on the import or export of steel. The success of the ECSC
Treaty emboldened the six member states to propose a European Defense
Community and a European Political Community. However, these efforts failed.61
The failure of these efforts convinced the member states to limit their subsequent
efforts to the creation of the EEC. Hence, the EEC Treaty addressed primarily
economic issues.62
Initially, the ECJ rebuffed efforts of individuals who beseeched it to protect
their human rights. The Court claimed that it had no competence or jurisdiction
to consider human rights claims. These claims were generally brought under two
arguments: either individuals sought to invoke human rights protections contained
in their national constitutions, or they argued that protection of fundamental
human rights was implicit in the treaties establishing the European Community.
The Court rejected both arguments. It ruled that Community law was superior to
national law (much in the manner that U.S. federal law is supreme when
compared to the law of individual states), and, furthermore, that Community law
was limited to economic matters, and provided no basis for a claimed violation of
human rights.63
However, the Court was forced to reconsider these issues a short time later.
Some member states, such as German , had national constitutions that provided
very strong human rights protections. Perhaps out of concern for such strong
60. Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
61. The efforts failed when the French National Parliament refused to debate the European
Political Community Treaty, thereby effectively killing both it and the earlier European Defense
Community Treaty. See Carolan, supra n. 19, at ch. 2.
62. See generally Carolan, supra n. 19, at ch. 1.
63. See e.g. Stork, 1959 E.C.R. 17; Cases 36, 37, 38 & 40/59, Prasident Ruhrkolen-
Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v. High Authority, 1960 E.C.R. 423 (rejecting claims based on national law
and declining to base human rights protections on Community law).
64. Plaintiffs relied on protections in the German national constitution in Prasident Ruhrkolen-
VerkaufsgeselLschaft, 1960 E.C.R. 423. The Irish Constitution also contains strong protection of
individual human rights, at articles 40.1 (equality), 40.4 (personal liberty), and 40.6 (freedoms of
expression, assembly, and association).
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protection of human rights by member states, the Court concluded that protection
of fundamental human rights was implicit in the law of the European
Community.6' However, in the absence of any express written statement of these
rights in the ECSC Treaty, it was left to the Court to elaborate on the scope of
these human rights protections. In a series of decisions, the Court gave shape to
the fundamental human rights that formed an unwritten part of Community law.66
The Court drew inspiration from the human rights principles common to the
member states of the European Community and from international agreements to
which the member states were signatories, such as the European Convention on
Human Rights.67
The development of human rights principles in EU law broadened the scope
of Court review of claims of discrimination. In other words, in evaluating claims
of discrimination based on transsexuality or homosexuality, the Court would be
required to interpret existing antidiscrimination legislation in light of fundamental
principles of human rights. The Court could also invoke general principles of the
Community law of fundamental human rights as an additional source of
protection, if it so wished.
The political institutions of the European Community reacted to these
developments by expressly adopting human rights principles in subsequent
amendments to the treaties underpinning the Community.68 One of the most
notable developments to date has been in the EU Treaty, the so-called Maastricht
Treaty, which states: "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of
law, principles which are common to the Member States., 69 Another notable
development has been the adoption of a Charter of Fundamental Rights, which
was proclaimed by the European Council at the Nice Summit, at the time of
65. See e.g. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419; Case 11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
66. See e.g. Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575; Case 44/79, Hauer
v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727; Case 4/73, J. Nold, Kohlen v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R.
491. These cases identify various sources that have shaped the content of human rights protections
under EU law.
67. It is difficult to overstate the significance of the Court's "discovery" of human rights principles
implicit in the unwritten, general principles of EU law. It would be akin to the United States Supreme
Court announcing that it had discovered the protections contained in the U.S. Bill of Rights in the
absence of the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Such a dramatic "discovery" would raise
numerous complications regarding the substance and scope of the newly-discovered human rights
protections. These complications indeed ensued after the development of human rights principles in
the jurisprudence of the ECJ. For instance, the Court has, on occasion, given an interpretation of a
principle inspired by the separate European Convention on Human Rights, only to have this
interpretation contradicted in a later decision of the European Court of Human Rights, a body
officially charged with enforcing the Convention on Human Rights. Compare e.g. Joined Cases 46/87
& 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 1989 E.C.R. 2859 (rejecting claim that the right of privacy
extended in the Convention on Human Rights applied to a business), with Chappell v. United
Kingdom, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 (1989) (noting that the European Court of Human Rights
suggested that the right of privacy extended in the Convention on Human Rights might apply to a
business).
68. See e.g. EU Treaty, supra n. 2, at preamble ("CONFIRMING their attachment to the principles
of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms . .
69. Id. at art. 6(1).
[Vol. 40:527
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signing of the Nice Treaty.70 The legal effect of this proclamation is uncertain.
However, the Draft Treaty for a Constitution for Europe, currently being
considered, proposes to incorporate the Charter wholesale into the Constitution.71
The creation of human rights principles in EU law was, and remains, an
iterative process. The Court recognized unwritten fundamental rights as part of
72the general principles of EU law. The political institutions thereafter expressly
incorporated human rights principles into subsequent treaty amendments and
secondary legislation, thereby broadening the competencies of the EU.73  In
subsequent litigation involving treaty articles or legislation embodying human
rights principles, the Court was called upon to interpret, and thus limit or expand,
the scope of human rights protections. The Court thus plays a critical role in
determining the outer boundaries of legislative powers under the limited
competence attributed to the EU in the founding and amending of treaties.
The next section of this article sets forth EU legislative actions with respect
to laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, before considering
the potential impact of Court decisions on the implementation of this legislation.
V. LEGISLATION PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. European Union Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Sexual
Orientation
The political institutions of the EU have played a leading role in promoting
• . • 74
legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In some
ways, at least superficially, the actions taken by these political institutions have
favored the rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals much more than
70. The proclaimation accompanying the Nice Treaty is officially known as the Charter of the
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000).
71. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, O.J. (C 310) pt. 1, art. I-1 (2004)
[hereinafter Constitution for Europe]. The draft Constitution also proposes that the EU as an entity
become a signatory to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, to which all of the member states of the EU already are signatories. Id. at art. 2. This
would establish a clear legal hierarchy in the interpretation of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, with the European Court of Human Rights
becoming the final arbiter of its meaning. It would also avoid the anomalous situation of the past,
when the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights occupied essentially equal positions with
respect to the interpretation of the Convention in respect to claims arising within the EU, and at times
reached conflicting interpretations of identical provisions of the Convention. See supra n. 66.
72. See e.g. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E.C.R. 419 (acknowledging human rights
protections as part of unwritten general principles of EU law).
73. For example, the Treaty of Amsterdam amended Article 6 (formerly Article F) of the EU
Treaty. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities, and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 11, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Amsterdam Treaty]. Article 6(2) of the EU Treaty now provides: "The Union shall respect
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law."
74. See e.g. Council Directive 2000/78, supra n. 3 (prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination based on
sexual orientation).
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actions by corresponding U.S. federal institutions. In other ways, however, the
laws enacted by these European political institutions may seem anemic when
measured against any common-sense notions of equality or fundamental human
rights. In some cases, this anemia is the result of weakened protections embodied
76in the European legislation. In other cases, the anemia likely will result from
application of the confusing and contradictory rulings of the ECJ in the
interpretation and application of European equality legislation.
In amendments to the EC Treaty brought about by the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1997,77 the European Community obtained express powers to
legislate against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Article 13(1) now
provides:
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within the limits of the
powers conferred by it upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.
Pursuant to the powers conferred under Article 13, the Commission
proposed and the Council unanimously adopted a council directive establishing a
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation ("General
Framework Directive"). 78  This directive addresses employment discrimination
based on religion, disability, age, and sexual orientation. A separate directive,
adopted before the General Framework Directive, addressed discrimination based
on race and ethnicity.79 (Council Directives pre-dating the adoption of Article 13
of the Treaty of Amsterdam already addressed discrimination between men and
women.) With respect to discrimination based on sexual orientation, the
Preamble to the General Framework Directive states:
Discrimination based on... sexual orientation may undermine the achievement
of the objectives of the EC Treaty, in particular the attainment of a high level of
employment and social protection, raising the standard of living and the quality of
life, economic and social cohesion and solidarity, and the free movement of persons.
To this end, any direct or indirect discrimination based on... sexual
orientation.. . should be prohibited throughout the Community.
8 0
The General Framework Directive required member states to adopt in their
national laws legislation that implemented its principles of nondiscrimination
based on sexual orientation. The deadline for this implementation was December
75. For instance, Congress has not amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include
sexual orientation.
76. See Bruce Carolan, Rights of Sexual Minorities in Ireland and Europe: Rhetoric versus Reality,
19 Dick. J. Intl. L. 387 (2001).
77. Supra n. 73.
78. Council Directive 2000/78, supra n. 3.
79. Council Directive 2000/43 of 29 June 2000 Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment
between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22.
80. EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at preamble 11-12; id. at art. 249.
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2, 2003. Thus, as of December 3, 2003, all member states were required to have in
place national legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The 10 states that joined the EU in May 2004-including some fairly conservative
countries of Central and Eastern Europe-will be required to adopt similar
legislation.8
The General Framework Directive is not the only recent development by
EU political institutions addressing discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The EU debated whether to adopt the Charter of Fundamental Rights
("Charter")82 as it prepared for the European Summit in Nice, France. The Nice
Summit produced the Treaty of Nice, which provided for institutional changes
necessary to accommodate expansion of the EU to include new member states
from Central and Eastern Europe. The Draft Treaty for a Constitution for
Europe also incorporates the Charter.8 3  The Charter contains a number of
provisions concerning sexual orientation. Article 21(1) of the Charter concerns
"nondiscrimination," and provides that "[a]ny discrimination based on ... sexual
orientation shall be prohibited." It is likely that the Constitution for Europe will
likewise provide that "discrimination based on... sexual orientation is
prohibited."
Thus, on one level, the political institutions of the EU have proved
themselves far more willing to adopt statements of nondiscrimination based on
sexual orientation than their counterparts in the United States. However, this
begs the question: What is the content of these proclamations? It is one thing to
prohibit discrimination in the abstract. It is another to examine its application in a
concrete situation. We can consider the issue by examining antidiscrimination
laws adopted in one EU member state, Ireland, and asking if these laws satisfy the
requirements of EU law. It is conceivable that an individual could argue that Irish
law fails to implement EU law adequately.84 The Irish courts may ultimately refer
such a case to the ECJ for a determination of whether Irish law adequately
81implements the requirements of the General Framework Directive.
81. We can contrast this with the United States, where efforts to adopt federal legislation banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have been unsuccessful. The approximate parallel to
the European experience would be if the U.S. Congress amended Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
to include sexual orientation as a category protected from discrimination in employment and housing.
This is not likely to happen in the near future. A limited number of states has adopted
antidiscrimination laws directed at sexual orientation, and a growing number of municipalities has
done likewise. For a comprehensive list of states and municipalities that have adopted laws or
ordinances prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, see Carrie Evans, Equality from
State to State: Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Americans and State Legislation (Human Rights
Campaign Found. 2004) (available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=About-HRC&
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=24538). But broad federal
legislation would appear to be some way off.
82. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 18, 2000, O.J. (C 364) 1 (2000).
83. Constitution for Europe, supra n. 71, at pt. 1, art. I-1.
84. See e.g. Case 41/74, van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337 (noting that plaintiff claimed
the U.K. failed to adequately implement a directive limiting grounds on which EU nationals could be
prevented from entering the country).
85. Under the doctrine of direct effect, an individual may invoke EU law in a national court, and
the national court must give effect to such law. Supra n. 18. However, with so many national courts
interpreting EU law, this might pose a risk of inconsistent interpretations of identical provisions of EU
15
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As mentioned, member states were required to adopt national legislation to
implement the General Framework Directive by the beginning of 2004. In fact,
Ireland had adopted legislation as early as 1998, in the form of the Employment
Equality Act,86 that prohibited employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Under EU law, a member state is permitted to cite to existing law as
fulfilling the obligation to implement the requirements of a later-adopted
directive. 7 Ireland is certain to do so. This raises the question of whether Ireland
has afforded adequate protection under national law to satisfy the obligation to
implement the terms of the Directive, or whether its national law is deficient. The
Commission can bring an enforcement action against a member state if it believes
the member state has failed to take adequate steps to implement a directive, or if
its efforts constitute mere window dressing."' A more likely possibility is that an
individual who fails to obtain relief under national law will argue that the state has
failed to implement the law adequately, leading ultimately to a decision by the
ECJ. The next section considers whether the Irish legislation adequately
implements the terms of the Directive.
B. Irish Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
In 1997, a subdivision of the U.S. Department of State issued a report
entitled "Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 for Ireland."' 9 This
report noted that Irish law did not prohibit discrimination based on disability,
race, sex, religion, language, or social status,90 but failed to even note the concept
of discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, since this report issued,
there has been a flurry of legislative activity in Ireland directed toward
employment discrimination, including discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The most significant of these activities was the adoption of the Employment
Equality Act of 1998 and the Equal Status Act of 2000. Among other things, these
acts expressly forbid discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment
law. EU law includes a mechanism for ensuring uniform interpretation of EU law by national courts of
the member states. Article 234 of the EC Treaty provides that any national court or tribunal may
make a reference to the ECJ seeking interpretation of EU law, where that law is necessary to give a
decision. The highest national court must make such a reference. The ECJ provides an interpretation
of the relevant law and returns the case to the national court, which enters judgment in accordance
with the interpretation provided by the ECJ.
86. EEA, supra n. 5.
87. See e.g. Marshall, 1986 E.C.R. 723 (noting that the U.K. relied upon provisions of its Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 as implementing requirements imposed by the EU Equal Treatment Directive
of 1976).
88. The Commission, among other responsibilities, acts as guardian of the treaties. Articles 226 and
228 of the EC Treaty outline the steps that the Commission can take to bring an enforcement action
against a member state for its alleged failure to fulfill its obligation under EU law. These failures
include the outright refusal to implement a directive into national law as well as the inadequate
implementation of a directive into national law. An enforcement action by the Commission against a
member state ultimately can result in a fine being imposed upon the member state by the ECJ.
89. U.S. Dept. of St., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Ireland Country Report on
Human Rights Practices for 1996 (Jan. 30, 1997) (available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human
_rights/1996_hrp_reportireland.html).
90. Id. at § 5.
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and public accommodation. On the one hand, it may be surprising to learn that
conservative, Catholic Ireland has had national legislation prohibiting
discrimination against homosexuals since 1998 (the national legislature repealed
laws criminalizing homosexual acts in 1993).91 On the other hand, there is the
question of the substance of this protection.
Take, for example, a common complaint by homosexuals-that of denial of
employee "spousal" benefits for same-sex couples, i.e., benefits provided to the
opposite-sex spouse of a heterosexual employee. Does the Irish Employment
Equality Act provide a remedy for this complaint? Could a lesbian bring a claim
against her employer if she sought and was denied, for example, health insurance
for her same-sex partner? Would this be a prohibited form of sexual orientation
discrimination under Irish law?
The answer is no. Section 34 of the Irish Employment Equality Act is
entitled "Savings and exceptions related to the family, age or disability." This
section expressly provides that nothing contained in the Employment Equality
Act makes it unlawful for an employer to provide "a benefit to or in respect of a
person as a member of an employee's family."2 Could the lesbian employee
successfully argue that her same-sex partner is a member of her "family"? In
other words, could she ask an Irish court to give a broad interpretation to the
word "family" so as to include a same-sex partner?
The answer, again, is no. Section 2 of the Act provides that "member of the
family" for the purposes of the Act means "that person's spouse," or "a brother,
sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, lineal ancestor or lineal descendant of that
person or that person's spouse."93 Although Irish law does not provide a statutory
definition of "spouse," it is extremely unlikely that an employee could argue that
her same-sex partner was her "spouse."
91. Laws prohibiting male-male sexual acts in Ireland were repealed as the result of the decision of
the European Court of Human Rights in Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1988).
92. EEA, supra n. 5, at § 34(1)(b).
93. The Irish Constitution contains exceptionally strong language regarding the family, the role of a
woman within the family, and the state's obligation to the family. This language could be viewed as
strongly conservative and resistant to an expansive interpretation of "family." Article 41 of the Irish
Constitution, known in the Irish language as Bunreacht Na htireann, provides, inter alia, "The State
recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral
institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive
law." It goes on to provide:
[Tjhe State recognises that by her life within the home, woman gives to the State a support
without which the common good cannot be achieved.
The State shall, therefore, endeavour to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by
economic necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home.
Id. With respect to marriage, Article 41 provides: "The State pledges itself to guard with special
care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to protect it against attack."
Id.
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Furthermore, if we assume hypothetically that the lesbian employee is fired
from her job in response to the request for employee benefits for her same-sex
partner (perhaps because her employer did not realize she was in a same-sex
relationship when she was hired), it is not clear that there would be a remedy
under the Irish Employment Equality Act. This could be portrayed as not
constituting discrimination based on sexual orientation, but rather discrimination
based on the fact that the employee is cohabiting. Discrimination based on
cohabitation is not prohibited under Irish law.94 Marital status discrimination is
prohibited, but "marital status" is defined as "single, married, separated, divorced
or widowed." 95
In Senate debates over amendments proposed to the Act, the Irish Minister
for Justice, John O'Donoghue, essentially conceded that discrimination against a
lesbian or gay man for living with a person of the same sex would not constitute
direct discrimination based on sexual orientation.96 In light of the Minister's
remark, we can hypothesize that it would be open to a defendant to argue that the
discrimination at issue was not sexual orientation discrimination, but
discrimination based on cohabitation, which is not prohibited by Irish law.
Senator David Norris, an openly-gay Irish senator, complained of this
anomaly in his usual colorful language when he said: "[I]f I were an employer, I
would say I did not discriminate against you because you are single, married,
separated, divorced or widowed, but because you are a pair of fairies living
together and I did not like it."' If Senator Norris is correct, the issue becomes
whether, in a subsequent lawsuit brought under Irish law, the ECJ will determine
that the Irish legislation fails to adequately implement the terms of the EU
General Framework Directive into the Irish national law. To answer this
question, we must consider previous judgments of the Court concerning
discrimination based on sexual orientation. The following section reviews these
judgments and suggests that EU law on this issue will be found lacking.
There are four cases relevant to this inquiry, P. v. S. and Cornwall County
Council,98 Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd.,99 D. & Sweden v. Council,'0° and K.B.
v. National Health Service Pensions Agency.'0 ' The following section deals with
each of these cases in turn.
94. EEA, supra n. 5, at § 6(2)(b).
95. Id.
96. 154 Seanad Deb. col. 371 (Feb. 18, 1998), at col. 379.
97. Id. at col. 380.
98. Case C-13/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143.
99. Case C-249/96, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621.
100. Joined Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319.
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VI. DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLAIMS OF
DISCRIMINATION BY SEXUAL MINORITIES
A. P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council
10 2
In P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, the ECJ considered whether the
law of the EU-which, by this time, embraced general principles of fundamental
human rights law-prohibited employment discrimination against transsexuals.
There was no express law of the EU that protected transsexuals from
discrimination. Instead, there was Article 119 of the EC Treaty (since re-
numbered as Article 141), which prohibited discrimination between men and
women in matters of pay. In addition, the European Community had adopted the
Equal Treatment Directive, which prohibited discrimination between men and
women in other matters affecting employment, such as termination. 1°3 There were
also the general principles of equality and nondiscrimination, which the ECJ had
declared to be implicit in the unwritten law of the Community.' 4 The issue was:
could any of these various sources of law offer protection to a person claiming
employment discrimination based on transsexuality? In other words, could
discrimination against a transsexual also be discrimination based on sex, and thus
a violation of Community law prohibiting discrimination between men and
women? Or, could the principles of fundamental human rights announced by the
Court be broad enough to embrace a claim of transsexual discrimination?
The facts of the case were as follows: P worked as a manager in an
educational institution operated by the Cornwall County Council. S was
Executive Director of the institution and P's superior. At the time P began
working for the County Council, P was biologically male. In April of 1992, S
noticed that P's work performance was deteriorating and counseled P. S invited P
to tell S about anything in P's personal life that might be affecting P's performance
at work. P responded by telling S that P was a woman trapped in a man's body,
and that P intended to undergo sex reassignment surgery.
The following September, after P had undergone minor sex reassignment
surgery, her105 employer gave her three months' notice of termination. P brought
an action for wrongful termination before the Employment Tribunal, the British
body charged with deciding cases of wrongful dismissal. P argued that she had
been discriminated against by reason of sex. The Tribunal concluded that the true
reason for P's dismissal was her intention to undergo gender reassignment. It also
concluded, however, that P's situation was not covered by the United Kingdom's
102. Case C-13/94, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143.
103. Council Directive 76/207, supra n. 56.
104. See e.g. Stauder, 1969 E.C.R. 419.
105. The Advocate General, in his recommendation to the ECJ, and the Court, in its decision,
adopted the convention of referring to P in the female gender, even when describing events that
occurred when P presented as biologically male. By adopting this convention, both the Advocate
General and the Court arguably refused to privilege biology over all other factors-such as
psychology-in determining gender. See Advoc. Gen. Op., P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 (available at
1995 WL 1564729). *This article also follows this convention in referring to P.
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Sex Discrimination Act of 1975, which was the national legislation that had
purported to introduce into U.K. national law the obligations imposed upon
member states under the European Community Equal Treatment Directive.
However, the Tribunal was uncertain whether the U.K. had properly
implemented the requirements of the Equal Treatment Directive into national
law. That is, the Tribunal queried whether or not Community law might provide
broader protection against discrimination than the national law that purported to
implement it. If this were the case, then the national court would be obligated to
apply Community law, and rule in favor of the transsexual employee, P. In order
to determine whether a prohibition on transsexual discrimination was covered by
the Equal Treatment Directive, the Industrial Tribunal referred the question to
the ECJ.
In the ECJ, P based her claim on the Equal Treatment Directive. The
Advocate General, an officer of the Court who makes a non-binding
recommendation to the Court as to how it should rule, gave his opinion.' °6 He
emphasized that the Equal Treatment Directive represented merely a specific
manifestation of a broader, general principle of European Community law,
namely, the principle of equality. The Advocate General recommended that the
Court rule that the Equal Treatment Directive precluded the dismissal of a
transsexual due to her sex. °7
The Court delivered a terse judgment. It ruled that the Equal Treatment
Directive "is simply the expression, in the relevant field, of the principle of
equality, which is one of the fundamental principles of Community law."138
Accordingly, the Court further stated:
[T]he scope of the directive cannot be confined simply to discrimination based on
the fact that a person is of one or other sex. In view of its purpose and the nature of
the rights which it seeks to safeguard, the scope of the directive is also such as to
apply to discrimination arising, as in this case, from the gender reassignment of the
person concerned.'0 9
In other words fundamental principles of human rights influenced the
Court's interpretation or construction of the Equal Treatment Directive. Against
the backdrop of human rights, it can be suggested that the Court gave a broad
interpretation to one phrase of the Directive so that it could be understood to
106. The office and responsibilities of the Advocate General are set forth in Article 222 of the EC
Treaty. The Advocate General does not have counterpart in a common law system such as that of the
United States. According to Article 222, the function of the Advocate General is "to make, in open
court, reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the ECJ, require his
involvement." In other words, the Advocate General gives a non-binding, independent opinion to the
Court, based on the submission of the parties to the case. There are several reasons why an Advocate
General is useful. Most cases reach the ECJ without a full-blown trial court record. The Advocate
General can therefore sharpen the issues for the Court, as a trial court record might. The Advocate
General also can summarize and critique submissions made by parties with a right to intervene in cases
before the ECJ, such as the member states and institutions of the EU.
107. Advoc. Gen. Op., P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R 1-2143.
108. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 118.
109. Id. at 91 20.
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include transsexuals. That phrase is contained in Article 2 of the Directive, and it
provides that: "[Tihe principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex... ,11O One interpretation of the
Court's ruling is that it interpreted the prohibition against sex discrimination to
include discrimination based on a sex change; another possible interpretation is
that sex discrimination includes adverse treatment for any reason related to sex
and not simply the division of people into male and female genders.
The Court might have stopped with its broad construction of the Equal
Treatment Directive. Nothing more was required to prohibit discrimination
against transsexuals. It did not, however, stop at this point. Instead, it provided
an alternate basis for its ruling. The Court ruled that the discrimination at issue
was a form of direct sex discrimination.11 ' That is, it concluded that P had been
discriminated against, even before undergoing the surgery to become anatomically
female, because she was a woman. This was a dramatic step-supported by an
analysis that the Court would later be forced to abandon-and it may have
reflected the sentiments expressed by Advocate General Tesauro, who had
written in his recommendation to the Court as follows:
[Ilt is necessary to go beyond the traditional classification and recognize that, in
addition to the man/woman dichotomy, there is a range of characteristics, behaviour
and roles shared by men and women, so that sex itself ought rather to be thought of
as a continuum. From that point of view, it is clear that it would not be right to
continue to treat as unlawful solely acts of discrimination on grounds of sex which
are referrable to men and women in the traditional sense of those terms, while
refusing to protect those who are also treated unfavourably precisely because of
• • 112
their sex and/or sexual identity.
Although the Advocate General did not suggest to the Court that this sentiment
form the express basis of its ruling, the Court's ruling is consistent with this view.
In order to formally support its conclusion that the discrimination of which P
complained was in reality a form of discrimination based directly on biological sex,
the Court offered a method for analyzing a claim of sex discrimination in a
situation such as one involving a transsexual. The proper analysis of the claim, the
Court said, involved comparing P's treatment when she was perceived to be a man
with her treatment as a woman: "Where a person is dismissed on the ground that
he or she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment, he or she is
treated unfavourably by comparison with persons of the sex to which he or she
was deemed to belong before undergoing gender reassignment."'. Thus, in P. v.
S., the Court proposed that the proper analysis by which to conclude whether
discrimination based on sex had occurred was to ask whether a difference of
treatment would result from a change of the complainant's sex.
110. Council Directive 76/207, supra n. 56, at art. 2.
111. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 1 21.
112. Advoc. Gen. Op., P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 1 17.
113. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 1 21.
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This analysis differs radically from the analysis in U.S. cases involving
discrimination against transsexuals. In the United States, transsexuals have
attempted to bring lawsuits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,114
which, among other things, prohibits discrimination based upon sex. However,
U.S. courts have held that Title VII's provisions prohibit discrimination based on
biological sex (i.e., discrimination based on the fact that a person is biologically
male or female), and are not available to support a claim of discrimination based
on transsexuality."5
The analysis on which this conclusion rests depends upon a different type of
comparison than that made in P v. S. In U.S. cases, courts typically ask whether a
male-to-female transsexual and a female-to-male transsexual would be treated
equally by their employer. The answer to this is invariably: Yes-both would be
fired. Thus, there is equality of treatment, albeit unpleasant treatment. However,
although there may be discrimination involved, that discrimination is not based on
the "sex" of the terminated employee-that is, on whether the employee is (or
was) a male or a female. The discrimination is based on something else, i.e.,
transsexuality, which is not protected under the express terms of Title VII.
One could argue that the holding in P. v. S. had potentially far-reaching
implications with respect to treatment by the ECJ of claims of discrimination
based on sexual orientation. That is, if under European Community fundamental
principles of human rights, the phrase "discrimination based on sex" should be
interpreted as including transsexuals, then, surely, the phrase should be construed
to include lesbians and gay men. Furthermore, if discrimination against
transsexuals constitutes a form of direct sex discrimination because they are
treated differently upon a change of their sex, then the same analysis might
support a claim by homosexuals that discrimination against them constitutes a
form of direct sex discrimination. The discrimination against a male in a
relationship with another male, for example, would vanish if one (hypothetically)
changed the sex of the victim of such discrimination to female.
Fueling this optimism on the part of the European lesbian and gay
community was some of the language contained in the recommendation of
Advocate General Tesauro and the judgment of the Court itself. For example, the
Advocate General wrote, as concerns transsexuals:
The discrimination of which women are frequently the victims is not of course due
to their physical characteristics, but rather to their role, to the image which society
has of women. Hence the rationale for less favourable treatment is the social role
which women are supposed to play and certainly not their physical characteristics.
In the same way it must be recognized that the unfavourable treatment suffered by
transsexuals is most often linked to a negative image, a moral judgment which has
nothing to do with their abilities in the sphere of employment.
1 6
114. See e.g. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Title VII does
not apply to claims of discrimination based on transsexuality).
115. See id.
116. Advoc. Gen. Op., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 20.
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These heady words were echoed by the Court when it stated: "To tolerate such
discrimination [against a transsexual] would be tantamount, as regards such a
person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is
entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard."
117
Lesbians and gays in Europe had reason to be optimistic that, in light of P. v.
S., they would be successful in seeking protection from employment
discrimination under the law of the European Community. In the case of Grant v.
South-West Trains Ltd., they had the opportunity to test this optimism. As it
turned out, their optimism was misplaced.
B. Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd.
Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. presented the ECJ with a claim of
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court had to decide
whether existing Community legislation, interpreted in light of principles of
equality and nondiscrimination embedded in fundamental human rights-
guarantees implicit in Community law-included a prohibition on discrimination
against lesbians and gays. The Court had the opportunity to rule that, despite the
lack of express legislative provisions, fundamental protection of human rights
implicitly prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The facts were as follows: Lisa Grant was employed by South-West Trains.
Her employment contract provided that travel concessions were available to a
"common law opposite sex spouse.""' South-West Trains had granted travel
concessions to the unmarried female partner of the man who had previously been
employed in Grant's position. However, South-West Trains denied Grant's
application for travel concessions for her female partner on the ground that they
were available only to a common law opposite sex spouse.
Grant brought an application before the Employment Tribunal. She claimed
the denial of travel concessions to her partner violated Article 119 (now Article
141) of the EC Treaty. The Tribunal made an Article 177 (now Article 234)
reference to the ECJ. In her arguments before the Court, Grant claimed that the
refusal to grant travel concessions to her female partner constituted direct sex
discrimination in violation of Article 119. Alternatively, Grant argued that the
refusal to grant travel concessions to her female partner constituted discrimination
based on sexual orientation, and that such discrimination should be considered
"discrimination directly based on sex."'
120
The Commission, along with the governments of France and the U.K.,
submitted written observations to the Court. The Commission accepted that
discrimination due to sexual orientation constituted discrimination based on sex
within the meaning of Article 119.121 However, it argued that the discrimination of
117. P. v. S., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2143 at 22.
118. Case C-249/96, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621.
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 16.
121. Id. at 123.
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which Grant complained was not based on her sexual orientation. Instead, it was
due to the fact that she was not living as part of a "couple" or did not have a
"spouse" as those terms were understood according to the laws of most member
states, the European Community, and the European Convention on Human
122Rights. The type of discrimination of which Grant complained was therefore
outside Article 119, since it was not based on sexual orientation at all.
Advocate General Elmer argued that P. v. S. represented a "decisive step
away from an interpretation of the principle of equal treatment based on the
traditional comparison between a female and male employee," '13 and that the
principle announced in P. v. S. should apply to Article 119. That is, sex
discrimination should not be limited solely to discrimination based on the sex of
the claimant, that is, whether the claimant was male or female. He found support
for his interpretation in the wording of Article 119, which mandated "equal pay
without discrimination based on sex."
Furthermore, as an alternative basis for his recommendation, Advocate
General Elmer concluded that direct sex discrimination was present in this case,
that is, that Grant had been discriminated against solely on the fact that she was a
woman. The policy regarding travel concessions, he argued, was not gender-
neutral. The sex of the employee and of the employee's partner was critical in
deciding whether to grant the concessions. Travel concessions were available to a
female employee only if her partner was male and vice versa. Therefore,
discrimination was based on sex within the terms of Article 119. The Advocate
General recommended that the Court conclude that the policy in question
violated Article 119.
Advocate General Elmer also proposed "opening up" the express
prohibitions of Article 119 to embrace situations where the sex of the employee
was not directly implicated in the decision whether or not to grant employee
benefits, and to allow a wider range of claims to be brought based on an argument
that unlawful sex discrimination had occurred. In the Advocate General's words,
Article 119 must be interpreted as "precluding forms of discrimination against
employees based exclusively, or essentially, on gender,"' 124 even if it was not the
gender of the employee that was the critical factor. The Article must be
understood "as prohibiting discrimination against employees not solely on the
basis of the employee's own gender but also on the basis of the gender of the
employee's child, parent or other dependent."'12 As an example, the Advocate
General stated that the Article must prohibit an employer from "denying a
household allowance to an employee for sons under 18 living at home when such
an allowance in otherwise equivalent circumstances was given for daughters living
at home.' 26
122. Id.
123. Advoc. Gen. Op., Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 at 115 (available at 1997 WL 1704998).
124. Id. at 1 16.
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How did the Court sort out these various arguments, and what did it rule?
The Court concluded that the discrimination at issue did not constitute direct sex
discrimination. 27 It rejected Grant's analysis of her claim of sex discrimination:
that "but for" her sex as a female (that is, if she herself were male), she would
have obtained travel concessions for her female partner. 28 According to the
Court, her situation had to be compared with that of a similarly-situated male: in
this case, a male who sought travel concessions for a male partner. There was no
sex discrimination when such a comparator was chosen, because "travel
concessions are refused to a male worker if he is living with a person of the same
sex, just as they are to a female worker if she is living with a person of the same
sex."1 29 Hence, there was no direct sex discrimination.
This analysis is arguably inconsistent with the Court's prior ruling in P. v. S.
Recall that in that case P had essentially been allowed to act as her own
comparator. That is, the Court inquired how P had been treated as a man, and
then asked how P had been treated when she was perceived as a woman or as
someone who wished to become a woman. Finding that P had been treated less
well as a woman than as a man, the Court ruled that there had been direct sex
discrimination based on sex.
If we apply the analysis from P. v. S. to Grant's situation, a different
conclusion is required. There is no disputing that if Grant's sex were male, she
would have been treated more favorably-that is, she would have obtained travel
concessions for her female partner. Indeed, the man who had previously occupied
Grant's position had received travel concessions for his unmarried female partner.
In Grant's view, "but for" her female sex, she would not have suffered
discriminatory treatment. Hence, in her view, there was direct sex discrimination.
However, the Court reverted to the "traditional" comparison, and one with which
we are familiar in U.S. cases: it compared the situation of a gay woman with that
of a gay man. Since both a gay woman and a gay man would be denied travel
concessions for their same-sex partner, there was no discrimination based on sex.
The discrimination, if at all, is based on something else.
The Court also had to consider whether that "something else" was sexual
orientation, and, if so, whether Community law prohibited discrimination based
on sexual orientation. These were the only issues remaining in the case, and they
were dispositive: if sexual orientation discrimination was involved and Community
law prohibited such discrimination, then Grant would win her case. If sexual
orientation discrimination was not involved-or if Community law did not
prohibit such discrimination-then Southwest Trains would prevail.
However, the Court took a detour and offered its opinion on same-sex
partnerships, in a way that is relevant to current debates about same-sex marriage
127. Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 at 23.
128. In fact, the male employee whom Grant had replaced had himself received travel benefits for
his female partner, to whom he was not married, strengthening Grant's argument that "but for" her
(female) sex, she would have obtained these benefits for her female partner. Id. at 17.
129. Id. at 27.
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in the United States and has implications for future judicial interpretation of
recent equality legislation in Europe. The Court considered whether "persons
who have a stable relationship with a partner of the same sex are in the same
situation as those who are married or have a stable relationship outside marriage
with a partner of the opposite sex.' 30 The Court stated that most member states
did not consider such relationships as equivalent, that Community law had not
adopted laws providing for such equivalence, and that the Commission of Human
Rights had held that stable homosexual relationships do not fall within the scope
of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.31 Thus, the Court concluded, "in the present state of the law
within the Community, stable relationships between two persons of the same sex
are not regarded as equivalent to marriages or stable relationships outside
marriage between persons of opposite sex. 1 32 Therefore, an employer did not
violate Community law if it did not treat such relationships as equivalent to
relationships between persons of the opposite sex.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that Community law covered
discrimination based on sexual orientation, which was the only issue that truly
remained. The statement in P. v. S., that Community law prohibiting sex
discrimination was not limited to whether a person was of one sex or another,
applied only to the case of transsexuals and had no application in the case of
sexual orientation.13 3 "Community law as it stands at present," the Court wrote,
"does not cover discrimination based on sexual orientation, such as that in issue in
the main proceedings.' 134
Thus, after the two cases of P. v. S. and Grant, one could argue that EU law
was inconsistent or incoherent. It was unlawful to discriminate in employment
against transsexuals, or those who announced their intention to undergo sex
reassignment surgery. However, it was legal to discriminate in employment
against homosexuals, because European Community law did not prohibit anti-gay
discrimination. As inconsistent as the rulings in P. v. S. and Grant seemed, it was
the language of the Grant Court concerning same-sex partnerships, and the
submission by the Commission-the EU institution charged with enforcing EU
law-that had broader implications on the issue of the rights of same-sex couples
under legislation purporting to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation.
Modem antidiscrimination laws are based on an Aristotelian notion of
equality-that like situations must be treated alike. Hence, laws prohibiting
discrimination forbid like situations from being treated differently, absent some
justification for the difference in treatment. Usually, a party is complaining of
some adverse treatment when compared to another party in a similar situation.
130. Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 22.
132. Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 at 1 35 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 42.
134. Id. at 91 47.
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However, the success of such a claim depends upon a determination that the
situations being compared are similar. If the situations are not similar, then the
claim fails at the outset. It is not against the law to treat different situations
differently. If the situations being compared are not similar, then a finding of
discrimination does not result from treating one situation less favorably than the
other.
We can compare the analysis of the ECJ with that of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health."' In
Goodridge, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that there was,
essentially, no legally significant difference between an opposite-sex couple and a
same-sex couple that would justify denial of the right to marry (and the benefits
accompanying civil marriage) to a same-sex couple. The court implicitly regarded
the situations as similar when it effectively ruled that denial of the right to marry
to same-sex partners relegated them to a form of second-class citizenship
inconsistent with the guarantees of equal protection contained in the
Massachusetts Constitution.
But what if, as the ECJ has concluded, the situations are not similar? What
if a same sex couple is somehow not like an opposite-sex couple? Then
differences in treatment between the two situations cannot be described as
discriminatory.
The analysis of the Massachusetts case differs radically from that of the ECJ
decisions. The Massachusetts Court concluded that same-sex partnerships are
sufficiently similar to opposite-sex partnerships to require access to the rights
afforded by marriage under a guarantee of equal treatment.1 36 The ECJ, on the
other hand, has concluded that "stable relationships between two persons of the
same sex are not regarded as equivalent to marriages or stable relationships
outside marriage between persons of the opposite sex.,137 Thus, treating same sex
partners adversely-by denying benefits available to opposite-sex partners, for
example-does not constitute a form of unequal treatment. The cases are not
similar; thus differences in treatment are allowed.
The Court did not justify its conclusion that the situations are inherently
different. However, as the next case, D & Sweden v. Council, demonstrates, the
Court's opinion has had a profound effect on decisions concerning recognition of
same-sex partnerships.
135. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
136. The Massachusetts legislature subsequently asked the Supreme Judicial Court whether a
separate civil status for same-sex couples that provided benefits virtually identical to same-sex
marriages would satisfy the obligation to allow same-sex couples to marry. The Court rejected this
approach, stating that in the history of the United States, "separate is seldom, if ever, equal." In re Op.
of the JJ. to the Sen., 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (2004).
137. Grant, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 at 35.
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C. D & Sweden v. Council 138
The case of D & Sweden v. Council brought the issue of the rights and
privileges, if any, accompanying same-sex partnerships under EU law into sharper
focus. However, the ECJ showed itself unwilling to develop such rights, in the
absence of legislation from the political institutions of the EU.
D, the plaintiff, was a member of a same-sex partnership that had been
registered under the laws of Sweden. According to Sweden, which intervened in
the case on behalf of D, a same-sex registered partnership enjoyed virtually all of
the same benefits that accompanied heterosexual marriage. D was employed by
the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers had a set of employee
regulations. These regulations provided that married employees would receive a
supplemental payment but made no provision for payment of such a supplement
to unmarried partners, same-sex or otherwise. Nor did the regulations expressly
contain language prohibiting anti-gay discrimination, although such a rule was
adopted during the course of the lawsuit. D applied for the supplemental benefits
available to married Council employees.
In the ECJ, the Advocate General recommended that the Court rule against
D. 139 Although the EU had by this time adopted the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, the Advocate General did not believe it required a ruling in favor of D. In
fact, he cited an explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft Charter as
supporting the denial of the benefits. 14
The ECJ followed the recommendation of the Advocate General. By the
time of the appeal, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, all of which give
same-sex couples benefits very similar to marriage, had intervened to support D.
They argued that the denial of benefits violated the general principle of equality
that formed part of the fundamental principles of human rights of EU law. The
Court rejected this argument, largely by noting that opposite-sex unmarried
couples also did not receive the benefits. Thus, in the Court's view, there was no
discrimination based on sexual orientation. As the Court stated:
[A]s regards infringement of the principle of equal treatment of officials irrespective
of their sexual orientation, it is clear that it is not the sex of the partner which
determines whether the household allowance is granted, but the legal nature of the
ties between the official and the partner.
14 1
The Court did not consider the fact that same-sex couples could not marry
while opposite-sex couples could. From the perspective of those hoping to
advance the situation of those who choose same-sex partnerships, the case is
disappointing for several reasons. First, unlike the situation in Grant, where the
ruling would have immediately impacted national laws (albeit laws designed to
138. Joined Cases C-122/99P & C-125/99, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319.
139. Advoc. Gen. Op., D & Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319.
140. Id. at 97. The explanatory memorandum made clear that in prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was not intended to compel member states
to offer same-sex marriage.
141. D & Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319 at 47.
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implement a European Community directive), the D & Sweden case involved the
interpretation of employee guidelines for an institution of the EU. The Court was
less vulnerable to an accusation that it was engaging in social experimentation at
the expense of a member state. Nevertheless, the Court chose to give a
conservative interpretation to the Council regulations.
Secondly, the official had the support of his own member state, which
regarded his partnership as essentially equivalent to that of opposite-sex marriage.
The European Community has no competence within its range of limited
competence to define the term "marriage" for the member states and, upon a
submission from Sweden that its form of registered partnership was essentially
equivalent to marriage, the Court should have been willing to require that
supplemental grants for "married" officials be provided to D. This would have
left the ECJ with the ability to rule against a Community employee from a
member state with a strong public policy against same-sex marriage, while
granting benefits if the employee came from a member state that allowed such
marriages.
Furthermore, the Court seems to be selective in recognizing the increasing
acceptability of providing some form of recognition and/or benefits to same sex
partners at the national level. As the case of P. v. S. demonstrated, the Court is
willing to take a dynamic approach to extending rights in situations where a survey
of the general attitudes in the member states would justify doing so. A good faith
survey of attitudes in the EU might have led the Court to take a more progressive
stance on the interpretation of the relevant employee regulation. Laws
142criminalizing homosexuality had been struck down many years ago in Europe.
Some member states, such as Ireland, had adopted laws prohibiting anti-gay
discrimination. 43 The EC Treaty had been amended to allow the Community to
compel member states to adopt laws protecting sexual minorities from
discrimination." In addition, as the submissions from several member states
demonstrated, national governments have granted increasing rights to same-sex
couples under national law. In light of these considerations, D & Sweden would
have seemed a perfect case for a limited extension of recognition of same-sex
partnerships under Community law. However, this was not to be.
Finally, D & Sweden represents a further development of the argument that
same-sex and opposite-sex relationships are fundamentally different, even where
142. See Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 573 (1983).
143. See e.g. EEA, supra n. 5, at § 6. Section 6(1) and (2)(d) of the Act provides:
(1) For the purposes of this Act, discrimination shall be taken to occur where, on any of
the grounds in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as "the discriminatory grounds"), one
person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated.
(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those
grounds for the purposes of this Act) are-
(d) that they are of different sexual orientation (in this Act referred to as "the sexual
orientation ground").
144. See EC Treaty, supra n. 7, at art. 13.
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the same-sex relationship is registered under national law. However, as shown
above, in the area of transsexuality, the Court has been willing to expand rights
and privileges, even against contrary national law. The next section explores a
case that further demonstrates the seeming incoherence of the rulings by the
Court in the area of sexual minorities.
D. K.B. v. National Health Service Pensions Agency'45
In this case, KB, a nurse working for the U.K. National Health Service
brought an action before the British Employment Tribunal alleging pay
discrimination based on sex. She failed in both the Employment Tribunal and the
Employment Appeals Tribunal, and, on appeal to the U.K. Court of Appeal, that
court made a preliminary reference under Article 234, inquiring whether U.K. had
violated Community law.
KB claimed that a pension plan that limited survivor benefits to the "spouse"
of an employee constituted sex discrimination against her. KB was in a long-term
relationship with a female-to-male transsexual. They could not marry because
British law only allowed a marriage between a man and a woman. Furthermore,
British law did not allow a transsexual to amend a birth certificate in order to
reflect the sex to which he or she belonged after sex reassignment surgery.
Therefore, in the eyes of the British law, KB was in a relationship with another
woman, and, as such, was not able to marry her partner.
This case took place against the backdrop of a pair of decisions in the
European Court of Human Rights, Goodwin v. United Kingdom1 46 and I. v. United
Kingdom,47 in which the Court ruled that it was a violation of a transsexual's right
to marry under Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights to
forbid a transsexual to marry a person of the sex to which the transsexual
previously had belonged. Although the EU is not yet a party to the European
Convention on Human Rights (though the Draft Constitution for Europe now
being considered proposes that the Union accede to membership in the
Convention), the European Convention on Human Rights is one of the sources
from which the ECJ draws inspiration in determining the scope of fundamental
human rights under EU law.
The K.B.Court noted that the U.K., in reaction to its ruling in P. v. S., had
amended its sex discrimination laws to provide that discrimination against
transsexuals was a form of prohibited sex discrimination. The Court also noted
that, in light of the decision in Goodwin, it was likely that the U.K. would allow
transsexuals to amend their birth certificates to reflect their altered sex. The
Court held that it was a violation of EU law to refuse to pay a survivor's pension
to the female-to-male transsexual partner of an employee in a private pension
145. Case C-117/01, 2004 E.C.R. 1-00000 (case has not been officially reported yet) (available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga-doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&Ig=en&numdoc=
62001J0117).
146. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2002).
147. 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. 53 (2002).
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plan. The refusal was a violation of the principle of equal pay for men and
women. The Court noted that the U.K. law forbidding a change to a birth
certificate to reflect the new post-operative sex of the transsexual made it
impossible for a transsexual to marry a partner of the opposite sex.
In making his recommendation, Advocate General Colomer noted that 13 of
the 15 member states allowed transsexuals to legally change their designated sex,
and thereby to marry a person of the sex opposite to the transsexual's acquired
sex. 148 Only the U.K. and Ireland did not permit transsexuals to legally change
their designated sex and thereby marry. The implication is that the Advocate
General and Court concluded that it would not violate EU law to deny a
survivor's pension to the same-sex partner, despite the fact that the law prevents
the same-sex partner from marrying. 149 Therefore, in the U.K., at the moment, it
is possible for a male-to-female transsexual, although remaining legally designated
as male, to obtain spousal survivor's benefits for a male partner; soon it will be
possible for a male-to-female transsexual to change her designated sex and
therefore legally marry, acquiring, among other things, survivor benefits for her
spouse.
However, under the same principles of fundamental human rights that have
established the foregoing rules, it will not be possible for a lesbian or gay
employee to obtain employee benefits, including spousal survivor benefits, for his
or her same-sex partner. Furthermore, the denial of such benefits will not be seen
as a form of discrimination based on sexual orientation, since the basis for the
denial is not the sex of the partner, but the nature of the relationship-even
though the employee is prevented from entering into a marriage relationship
precisely because of the sex of the partner.
VII. CHALLENGES TO THE ADEQUACY OF IRISH
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
A. Introduction
Ireland has adopted legislation that purports to prohibit discrimination in
employment based on sexual orientation. Ireland will rely upon this legislation as
adequately implementing the terms of Council Directive 2000/78. This is
permitted under the law of the EU, even though the Irish legislation was adopted
before the Directive mandating that national laws be adopted to prohibit
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.
If an Irish employee believes she has been discriminated against by reason of
her sexual orientation, she will rely upon the Irish national legislation rather than
the EU directive, which it implements. However, if she fails to obtain relief under
the national law, it is open to her to argue that the national law fails to adequately
implement the terms of the EU directive. Under the doctrine of direct effect, she
148. Advoc. Gen. Op., K.B., 2004 E.C.R. 1-00000 at 28.
149. Id.
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can seek to rely directly upon the greater protection afforded by the EU directive.
If she is unable, for technical reasons, to rely upon the principle of direct effect,
she may be able to seek damages against Ireland for its failure to comply with its
obligations under EU law to adequately implement the directive into the national
law.1
5 0
Irish legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation
expressly precludes a claim of sexual orientation discrimination resulting from the
denial of "family" benefits to the same-sex partner of an employee. This is
regardless of whether the partnership has been recognized in another EU
jurisdiction, such as the Netherlands, which permits couples of the same sex to
marry. If an employee brought a claim under Irish equality legislation over the
failure to grant benefits to a same-sex partner, that claim would fail in the Irish
courts.
It would then be open to the Irish employee to argue that the Irish
legislation fails to adequately implement the requirements of the EU directive,
and to rely directly upon the terms of the EU directive. The Irish courts would
ultimately be required to make a reference to the ECJ to seek a ruling on whether
the Irish law, with its express exception for "family benefits," adequately
implements the terms of the EU directive. The employee would also be able to
complain to the Commission that Ireland had failed to meet its obligations under
EU law by inadequately implementing the terms of the EU directive. In theory,
the Commission could bring a prosecution against Ireland in the ECJ for its failure
to adequately implement the directive.
The issue facing the Commission and/or the ECJ would initially be whether
the discrimination complained of constituted discrimination based on sexual
orientation. If it was a form of sexual orientation discrimination, and if the Irish
employee could not obtain a remedy under national law for this discrimination,
then she might be able to rely directly upon the underlying directive to obtain
relief, or pursue a claim of damages against Ireland for its failure to adequately
implement the directive. The Commission could bring an action with a view
toward compelling Ireland to amend its legislation to permit this type of claim.
The next section looks at the likely position of the Commission in considering a
claim that the Irish law fails to adequately implement the terms of the directive.
B. European Commission Position
The Commission is likely to conclude that the discrimination of which the
Irish employee complains is not a form of sexual orientation discrimination.
Instead, it is a form of discrimination based upon not being part of a traditional
marriage as that term generally is understood throughout the EU. The
Commission adopted this position in Grant, where, contrary to the ultimate ruling
of the ECJ, the Commission argued that general principles of EU law forbid
150. The ability to obtain damages for a member state's failure to implement adequately the terms of
a directive is an extension of the principle of direct effect and reflects the EC concern to assure the
effectiveness of EU law.
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discrimination based on sexual orientation, but that denial of same-sex partner
benefits (even where such benefits were available to opposite-sex unmarried
couples) did not constitute a form of sexual orientation discrimination. Thus, it is
unlikely that the Commission will take any action to require Ireland to amend its
national laws to allow a claim of denial of partner benefits as a form of sexual
orientation discrimination.
Irish law prohibits discrimination based on marital status. However, marital
status is defined in such a way as to preclude a claim of discrimination based on
being part of a cohabiting relationship, including a same-sex relationship. The EU
directive does not address claims of marital status discrimination. Once again, this
would preclude a demand by the Commission that Ireland amend its national laws
to provide a remedy for a claim of marital status discrimination by a same-sex
couple.
Therefore, one route available to an Irish employee who believes that Irish
law is deficient is foreclosed. The stance taken by the Commission in a previous
case before the ECJ rules out an argument to the Commission that denial of
partner employee benefits to an employee in a same-sex relationship constitutes a
form of sexual orientation discrimination. Of course, the Commission is not the
ultimate arbiter of the meaning of EU law. Ultimately, it will be for the ECJ to
determine whether denial of same-sex partner benefits to an employee constitutes
a form of sexual orientation discrimination under EU law.
C. Likely Position of the European Court of Justice
Our hypothetical Irish employee is not likely to fare any better with the ECJ.
The Court's decision in Grant, underscored in its later decision in D. & Sweden,
appears conclusive on this point. The Court sidestepped the issue of whether the
discrimination complained of amounts to discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Instead, the Court examined the nature of the relationship and
compared it with traditional, opposite-sex relationships. The Court has offered
little or no analysis in support of its conclusion that stable same-sex relationships
are inherently different from opposite-sex relationships, even unmarried opposite-
sex relationships. The Court has focused on the obligation of an employer relative
to a same-sex couple, and concluded that the employer need not "assimilate" ''
the same-sex relationship to that of an opposite-sex marriage, or even to an
opposite-sex unmarried relationship.
The Court's position conflicts with the letter and spirit of its rulings in the
area of transsexuals, P. v. S. and K.B. The analysis of the legal claim of direct sex
discrimination in the former case, if applied consistently in a situation of denial of
benefits in a same-sex relationship, likely would result in a finding of direct sex
discrimination under EU laws guaranteeing equal pay irrespective of sex. The
latter case shows a dynamic approach to claims of discrimination by transsexual
151. D & Sweden, 2001 E.C.R. 1-4319 at 38.
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individuals that is sorely lacking in considering claims by individuals in same-sex
relationships.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There have been dramatic EU legislative changes in employment rights for
lesbians and gays in Europe-changes that are unthinkable in the United States in
the current political environment. However, contrary to the experience of
lesbians and gays in the U.S., the ECJ likely stands as an impediment to the
realization of equal rights under legislation purporting to prohibit employment
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Decisions of the ECJ have narrowly
construed the concept of discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gratuitously foreclosed claims of sexual orientation discrimination based on denial
of family benefits to same-sex partners of lesbian and gay employees. These
rulings of the Court are made more difficult to comprehend due to the Court's
extremely liberal treatment of transsexual individuals. Further legislative change
is needed to address the concerns of same-sex couples under the EU law.
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